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Abstract—This paper centers on the comparison of three
different models that describe cascading failures of power sys-
tems. Specifically, these models are different in characterizing
the physical properties of power networks and computing the
branch power flow. Optimal control approach is applied on
these models to identify the critical disturbances that result in
the worst-case cascading failures of power networks. Then we
compare these models by analyzing the critical disturbances
and cascading processes. Significantly, comparison results on
IEEE 9 bus system demonstrate that physical and electrical
properties of power networks play a crucial role in the evolution
of cascading failures, and it is necessary to take into account
these properties appropriately while applying the model in the
analysis of cascading blackout.
Keywords—Cascading failure; power networks; optimal con-
trol; complex networks; model comparison.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cascading blackout of power networks usually affects large
areas of numerous people and results in huge economic losses.
For instance, the blackout in United States and Canada in
August 2003 was caused by the operation of protective relay to
sever the overloading branches and the inadequate situational
awareness of operators [1], affecting an area of 50 million
people causing a loss of more than 4 billion U.S. dollars.
In November 2006, a few European countries experienced a
severe blackout, which was triggered by the tripping of several
high-voltage lines in Northern Germany and resulted in the
outage of power supply for 15 million residents [2]. Thus, it
is of great significance to come up with an appropriate model
in order to identify the critical initial disturbances, which may
help to eliminate the cascading blackout of power systems in
advance.
Prior to making the model, it is necessary to figure out the
cause and process of cascading blackout in power systems.
Normally, a cascading blackout is initiated by one contingency
event of component outage and subsequent operator errors,
which brings about a sequence of component outages due
to the branch overloading [3], [4], [5]. During the cascading
process, each cascading step is considered as a topological
change of power networks. To the best of our knowledge,
there have been mainly three types of models characterizing
cascading failures of power systems [3]. To be specific, the
first type of models only describes the topological properties
of power networks and neglects the underlying laws of physics
and the principles of electrotechnics [6], [7], while the second
one takes into account the quasi-steady-state of power systems
and computes the power flow by solving the direct current
(DC) or the alternate current (AC) power flow equations [8],
[9], [10]. In addition, the last one aims to investigate the
emergence of cascading failures via dynamical modeling of
power system components [11]. Statistically, the topology
based complex network models behave like the DC power
flow model under intentional attacks [12]. Nevertheless, [13]
surveys the approaches of complex networks analysis in power
grids and points out the necessity to incorporate the physical
and electrical properties. This work attempts to compare
different models and determine the scope of their applications.
In the past decades, coordination and control of multi-
agent systems has attracted great interests of researchers in
various fields [14], [15], [16]. Multi-agent system approaches
are applied to power system control and protection since a
bus in power grids can be regarded as a smart agent able
to communicate and interact with its neighbors. [17] proposes
an adaptive multi-agent system algorithm to prevent cascading
failures. In this paper, we treat each bus as an agent that is
able to transmit, receive and consume power in power grids,
and optimal control theory is employed to identify the critical
disturbances that give rise to worst-case cascading failures
of power networks. The proposed models are compared by
analyzing the critical disturbances and cascading processes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the three different models and the optimal control
formulation of identifying disturbances. Section III provides
theoretical results for the optimal control problem, followed by
numerical simulations and comparisons in Section IV. Finally,
we conclude the paper and discuss future work in Section V.
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Fig. 1: Schematic diagram on the components of power systems.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
An electrical power system is normally composed of power
stations that generate electric power, transformers which raise
or lower the voltages, power transmission and distribution
networks and consumers to use electric power (see Fig. 1).
This paper focuses on the comparison of network models
characterizing the dynamical evolution of the transmission
and distribution networks in power systems. Fig. 2 presents
the cascading process of power systems in network models.
Specifically, the disruptive disturbances change the branch
admittance or the connection level, which leads to the over-
loading of some branches. Then the overloaded branches
are removed from the network to describe the operation of
circuit breakers in power grids, which reconfigures the network
topology. As a result, the change of network topology leads to
the imbalance of power flow once again. In short, it takes turns
to compute the power flow and update the network topology,
which describes the cascading process of power systems in
practice. The above process terminates once the power flow is
balanced without further evolution of network topology.
Our goal is to compare three different models by identifying
disruptive disturbances on vulnerable branches that result in
worst-case cascading failures and exploring the effects of
physical properties of power systems on the evolution of
cascading blackouts.
Actually, the three models share the same mechanism of
severing the overloading branches. To facilitate the theoretical
analysis, we design the following function to describe the state
shift of overloading branches
g(Pij , cij) =

0, |Pij | ≥
√
c2ij +
pi
2σ ;
1, |Pij | ≤
√
c2ij − pi2σ ;
1−sinσ(P 2ij−c2ij)
2 , otherwise.
(1)
where cij denotes the power threshold of transmission line
connecting Bus i to Bus j, and Pij refers to the transmission
power on this branch. It is worth pointing out that the func-
tion g(Pij , cij) approximates to step function as the tunable
parameter σ gets close to the positive infinity.
Essentially, the three models are different in the computation
of power flow. Next, we present their mathematical expressions
as follows.
A. Complex Network Model (CNM)
Without the consideration of physical properties, the com-
plex networks model of power systems is given by
P = AT diag(Sk)P ke (2)
where P ∈ Rnb denotes the vector of injected power on a total
of nb buses and A refers to the branch-bus incidence matrix
[18]. P ke = (P
k
ij) ∈ Rn is the vector of transmission power
on a total of n branches at the k-th cascading step. Sk is the
state vector on the connection level of branches. The operation
diag(x) obtains a square diagonal matrix with the elements
of vector x on the main diagonal. Since the matrix AT could
be nonsingular or a non-square matrix, a least square solution
to (2) is given as
P ke =
[
AT diag(Sk)
]+
P (3)
where [AT diag(Sk)]+ stands for the Moore-Penrose pseu-
doinverse of AT diag(Sk) [19].
B. DC-Based Network Model (DCM)
For high-voltage transmission networks, the DC power flow
equation is employed to compute the power flow [20].
P = AT diag(Y kp )Aθ
k, k = 0, 1, 2, ...,m− 1 (4)
where Y kp denotes the vector of branch admittance at the k-th
cascading step, and θk represents the vector of voltage angle
on each bus. Moreover, the solution to (4) is expressed as
θk = (AT diag(Y kp )A)
−1∗P
with the operator −1∗ being defined as a type of pseudoin-
verse in [9]. According to Lemma 3.2 in [9], the vector of
transmission power on n branches at the k-th cascading step
is given by
P ke = diag(Y
k
p )A(A
T diag(Y kp )A)
−1∗P (5)
where P ke = (P
k
ij) ∈ Rn with i, j ∈ Inb = {1, 2, ..., nb}.
Fig. 2: Cascading process of power systems in three models.
C. AC-Based Network Model (ACM)
The AC power flow equation allows for both active power
and reactive power in power networks, which provides the
most accurate description of practical power networks despite
high computation cost. For Bus i ∈ Inb , the AC power flow
equation is expressed as
Pi =
nb∑
j=1
|V ki | · |V kj |(Gkijcosθkij +Bkijsinθkij)
Qi =
nb∑
j=1
|V ki | · |V kj |(Gkijsinθkij −Bkijcosθkij)
(6)
where Pi and Qi are the net active power and reactive power
injected at Bus i, respectively. Likewise, |V ki | and |V kj | denote
the voltage magnitude on Bus i and Bus j at the k-th cascading
step, respectively. Gkij and B
k
ij are the real part and the
imaginary part of the element in the bus admittance matrix
AT diag(Y kp )A corresponding to the i-th row and j-th column,
respectively. θkij = θ
k
i − θkj is the difference in voltage angle
between Bus i and Bus j [21]. Unfortunately, there are no
analytical solutions to equation (6). Thus we can only estimate
its solution via numerical methods.
Remark II.1. The number of unknowns in the AC power
flow equation depends on the total number of buses in power
networks and the distribution of load buses and generator
buses. For load buses, the injected active power and reactive
power are known while the injected active power and the
voltage magnitude are available for generator buses.
D. Optimization Formulation
Then we present the state equation of transmission lines as
follows
Xk+1 = G(P ke )Xk + Uk, , k = 0, 1, ...,m− 1 (7)
where Uk represents the control input or disturbance on the
given branches, and Xk denotes the state vector of branches at
the k-th cascading step. Specifically, Xk describes the branch
state of connection in the CNM while it characterizes the
branch admittance in the DCM and ACM. In short, Xk can
be expressed as
Xk =
{
Sk, CNM;
Y kp , DCM or ACM.
In particular, the state matrix of transmission lines G(P ke ) at
the k-th cascading step is given by
G(P ke ) = diag

g(P ki1j1 , ci1j1)
g(P ki2j2 , ci2j2)
.
g(P kinjn , cinjn)
 ∈ Rn×n
The identification of initial disturbances that cause the worst
cascading failures of power systems is formulated as the
following optimal control problem.
min
Uk
J(Xm, Uk) (8)
with the cost function
J(Xm, Uk) = ‖Xm‖2 + 
m−1∑
k=0
‖Uk‖2
max{0, 1− k} (9)
where  is a positive weight, and ‖ · ‖ represents the 2-norm.
m is the total number of cascading steps. The proposed cost
function includes two terms. Specifically, the first term ‖Xm‖2
is differentiable with respect to Xm, and it quantifies the
connectivity of power networks at the final cascading step, and
the second term characterizes the control energy or disturbance
strength at the initial step. In addition, the parameter  is set
small enough so that the first term dominates in the cost
function. The objective is to minimize ‖Xm‖2 by adding
the appropriate control input or initial disturbance U0 on the
selected branches of power networks.
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we present theoretical results on optimal
control problem (8). For the discrete time nonlinear system,
optimal control theory provides the necessary conditions of
minimizing the cost function.
Proposition III.1. For the discrete time optimal control prob-
lem
min
Uk
J(Xk, Uk)
with the state equation
Xk+1 = F (Xk, Uk), k = 0, 1, ...,m− 1
and the cost function
J(Xk, Uk) = Φ(Xm) +
m−1∑
k=0
L(Xk, Uk),
the necessary conditions for the optimal control input Uk∗ are
given as follows
1) Xk+1 = F (Xk, Uk)
2) λk = ( ∂F∂Xk )
Tλk+1 +
∂L
∂Xk
3) ( ∂F
∂Uk
)Tλk+1 +
∂L
∂Uk
= 0
4) λm = ∂Φ∂Xm
where λk denotes the costate variable.
Proof. It is a special case (i.e., time invariant case) of the
optimal control for the time-varying discrete time nonlinear
system in [22]. Hence the proof is omitted.
By applying Proposition III.1 to the optimal control problem
(8), we obtain the necessary conditions for identifying the
initial disturbance of power systems with state equation (7).
Proposition III.2. The necessary condition for the optimal
control problem (8) is given by solving the following system
of algebraic equations.
Xk+1 = G(P ke )Xk + Uk, k = 0, 1, ...,m− 1 (10)
and the control input Uk is expressed as
Uk =
{
− 1
∏m−2
s=0
∂Xm−s
∂Xm−s−1 ·Xm, k = 0;
0n, k ≥ 1.
where 0n = (0, 0, ..., 0)T ∈ Rn
Proof. According to Proposition III.1, the necessary condi-
tions for the optimal control problem (8) can be determined
as
Xk+1 = G(P ke ) ·Xk + Uk (11)
(
∂Xk+1
∂Uk
)T
λk+1 +

max{0, 1− k} ·
∂‖Uk‖2
∂Uk
= 0 (12)
λk =
(
∂Xk+1
∂Xk
)T
λk+1 +

max{0, 1− k} ·
∂‖Uk‖2
∂Xk
(13)
λm =
∂‖Xm‖2
∂Xm
(14)
Thus, solving (12) leads to
Uk = −λk+1
2
max{0, 1− k} (15)
and simplifying (13) yields
λk =
(
∂Xk+1
∂Xk
)T
λk+1 (16)
with the final condition λm = 2Xm being derived from (14).
Then we obtain
λk+1 = 2
m−k−2∏
s=0
∂Xm−s
∂Xm−s−1
·Xm. (17)
Combining (15) and (17), we obtain
Uk = −max{0, 1− k}

m−k−2∏
s=0
∂Xm−s
∂Xm−s−1
·Xm (18)
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Fig. 3: Cascading process of the IEEE 9 bus system based
on the CNM. Red balls denote the generator buses, and green
ones refer to the load buses. Bus identity (ID) numbers and
branch ID numbers are marked as well. The arrows represent
the power flow on each branch. A branch is severed once its
transmission power exceeds the given threshold. The arrow
disappears if there is no power transmission on the branch.
which is equivalent to
Uk =
{
− 1
∏m−2
s=0
∂Xm−s
∂Xm−s−1 ·Xm, k = 0;
0n, k ≥ 1.
Substituting (18) into (11) yields
Xk+1 = G(P ke )Xk −
max{0, 1− k}

m−k−2∏
s=0
∂Xm−s
∂Xm−s−1
·Xm
k = 0, 1, ...,m− 1
(19)
which is the integrated mathematical expression of necessary
conditions (11), (12), (13) and (14) for the optimal control
problem (8). The proof is thus completed.
Remark III.1. Optimal control theory enables us to obtain the
initial disturbances leading to worst-case cascading failures
of power networks described by the CNM and the DCM.
Nevertheless, it does not apply to the ACM for the time being
since the closed-form solutions to the AC power flow equation
are not available.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present the numerical solution to the
system of algebraic equations (10) for both CNM and DCM
of IEEE 9 bus system. For the ACM, we analyze its cascading
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Fig. 4: Cascading process of the IEEE 9 bus system based
on the DCM.
process by adding the computed disturbance based on the
DCM. As is known, IEEE 9 bus system is composed of 9
buses (3 generator buses and 6 load buses) and 9 branches
[23]. Per unit values are adopted with the base value of power
100 MVA in numerical simulations. Other parameters for the
models of power networks are given as σ = 5×104,  = 10−4
and m = 9. The vector of power threshold on each branch
is c = (cij) = (1, 1.8, 1, 0.6, 0.5, 1, 1, 1, 1). In addition, the
solver “fsolve” in Matlab is adopted to solve the system of
algebraic equations (10).
A. Cascading Process
The parameter setting of the CNM is the same as the above
except that  = 6×10−8, indicating that more efforts are taken
to minimize the first term of cost function (9). We choose
Branch 2 as the target to add the initial disturbance with the
value of −1.22, which is obtained by solving the system of
algebraic equations (10). Initially, this computed disturbance
does not sever Branch 2, but it immediately leads to the outage
of Branch 2 due to the overloading of branch power flow. In
Fig. 3, Step 1 describes the normal state of power systems
without any disturbances. The outage of Branch 2 at Step 2
triggers the chain reactions at Step 3 and Step 4. Finally, the
power network stops evolving after Step 4 and ends up with
2 connected branches and no transmission of power flow.
For the DCM, Branch 2 is also selected as the target to add
the disruptive disturbance that initiates the chain reaction of
cascading blackout. In Fig. 4, the power network is running
in the normal state at Step 1, and the legends are the same
as those in Fig. 3. Then the disruptive disturbance obtained
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Fig. 5: Cascading process of the IEEE 9 bus system based
on the ACM.
by solving the system of algebraic equation (10) (susceptance
decrement 10.87) is added to exactly sever Branch 2 at
Step 2. Next, Branch 1, Branch 4 and Branch 5 break off
simultaneously at Step 3. Afterwards, the DCM reaches a
stable state, and it stops the evolution with 2 connected load
buses and no power supply.
Fig. 5 showcases the topology evolution of IEEE 9 bus
system based on the ACM. Branch 2 is severed as the initial
disturbance, which is the same as that of the DCM. Then
we can observe that the ACM evolves like the DCM in
the cascading process in terms of both the flow direction
and network topology at the first 3 cascading steps. This
demonstrates the good approximation of the DCM to the ACM
in the cascading process. Finally, the power network includes
3 connected branches at Step 4, which is slightly different
from the final configuration of the DCM.
B. Discussions
In order to quantify the performance similarity of the three
models in the cascading process, we introduce the root mean
square error (RMSE) of transmission power on branches,
which is defined as
RMSE(X,Y ) =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(Xi − Yi)2
where X,Y ∈ Rn denote the vectors of transmission power on
n branches. Intuitively, the smaller RMSE values between two
different models imply the more similar performance of these
two models at the cascading step. For example, the RMSE
1 2 3 4
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Fig. 6: RMSE of transmission power between two different
models at each cascading step.
values between any two different models at Step 1 are given
as: RMSE(CNM,DCM) = 0.0515, RMSE(DCM,ACM) =
0.0371 and RMSE(ACM,CNM) = 0.0656. The above
RMSE values indicate that the DCM is quite close to the
ACM, and the CNM is relatively closer to the DCM rather
than the ACM (0.0515 < 0.0656).
Fig. 6 presents the RMSE of transmission power between
two different models at each cascading step. All the RMSE
values are quite small at Step 1, which indicates the three
models are relatively close to each other in terms of branch
power flow. Actually, the three models achieve the same flow
direction on each branch according to simulation results in
Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. At Step 2, the RMSE value between
the DCM and the ACM is much smaller than those of the other
two model pairs, although the power flows of the three models
move in the same direction. All the RMSE values at Step 3
reach the peak, and the RMSE value between the DCM and the
ACM is still the smallest among the three model pairs. On the
whole, the DCM evolves in the same way that the ACM does
under the same initial disturbance (i.e., severing Branch 2). In
contrast, the CNM evolves along a totally different trajectory
after the outage of Branch 2. Finally, all the three models end
up with no transmission power on each branch at Step 4. Thus
all the RMSE values become 0.
The above comparisons indicate that the CNM is incompe-
tent to describe the cascading failures of power networks. As
for the DCM and the ACM, the two models allow us to obtain
the identical flow directions and similar flow magnitudes at
Step 1 and Step 2. It is worth pointing out that the numerical
algorithm in Matpower failed to converge at Step 3 due to the
nonlinearity and non-convexity of the AC power flow equation,
which results in the large disparity of power flow between the
DCM and the ACM. Thus, the DCM is a good substitute for
the ACM when numerical solutions to the AC power flow
equation are not available. In short, it is feasible to replace
the ACM with the DCM for small scale transmission networks
when we investigate cascading failures of power networks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the comparison of three dif-
ferent models that describe the cascading failure of power
networks. The critical risks of power networks based on these
models were identified with the aid of optimal control theory.
Moreover, simulation results on IEEE 9 bus system demon-
strated that the model based on pure network topology failed
to characterize the actual evolution of cascading blackouts.
This indicates that the physical and electrical properties have
to be taken into account appropriately even for the cascading
dynamics of a simple power network. Future work includes
the quantification of cascading path and the risk identification
of AC-based power networks.
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